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SIGECOM
2005
ACM

On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms

10 years 10 months ago
On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms
Algorithmic Mechanism Design focuses on Dominant Strategy Implementations. The main positive results are the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and computationally efficient mechanisms for severely restricted players (“single-parameter domains”). As it turns out, many natural social goals cannot be implemented using the dominant-strategy concept [37, 33, 22, 20]. This suggests that the standard requirements must be relaxed in order to construct general-purpose mechanisms. We observe that in many common distributed environments computational entities can take advantage of the network structure to collect and distribute information. We thus suggest a notion of partially informed environments. Even if the information is recorded with some probability, this enables us to implement a wider range of social goals, using the concept of iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. As a result, cooperation is achieved independent of agents’ belief. As a case study,...
Ahuva Mu'alem
Added 26 Jun 2010
Updated 26 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where SIGECOM
Authors Ahuva Mu'alem
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