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AI
2010
Springer
8 years 8 hour ago
Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: Addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
How do we build algorithms for agent interactions with human adversaries? Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications that involve human interaction, such...
James Pita, Manish Jain, Milind Tambe, Fernando Or...
ATAL
2008
Springer
8 years 5 months ago
Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
AAAI
2008
8 years 5 months ago
Efficient Algorithms to Solve Bayesian Stackelberg Games for Security Applications
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the adversary/follower) before the advers...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
ATAL
2009
Springer
8 years 9 months ago
Effective solutions for real-world Stackelberg games: when agents must deal with human uncertainties
How do we build multiagent algorithms for agent interactions with human adversaries? Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications that involve human intera...
James Pita, Manish Jain, Fernando Ordó&ntil...
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