Enforcing Truthful Strategies in Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanisms

Abstract. We commonly use the experience of others when taking decisions. Reputation mechanisms aggregate in a formal way the feedback collected from peers and compute the reputation of products, services, or providers. The success of reputation mechanisms is however conditioned on obtaining true feedback. Side-payments (i.e. agents get paid for submitting feedback) can make honest reporting rational (i.e. Nash equilibrium). Unfortunately, known schemes also have other Nash equilibria that imply lying. In this paper we analyze the equilibria of two incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms and investigate how undesired equilibrium points can be eliminated by using trusted reports.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2005
• Where: WINE
• Authors: Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
• Keywords: Economy, Incentive-compatible Reputation Mechanisms, Reputation Mechanisms, True Feedback, WINE 2005