The Power of Verification for One-Parameter Agents

We initiate the study of mechanisms with verification for one-parameter agents. We give an algorithmic characterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably better than mechanisms without verification, i.e., those previously considered in the literature. These results are obtained for a number of optimization problems motivated by the Internet and recently studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature. The characterization can be regarded as an alternative approach to existing techniques to design truthful mechanisms. The construction of such mechanisms reduces to the construction of an algorithm satisfying certain “monotonicity” conditions which, for the case of verification, are much less stringent. In other words, verification makes the construction easier and the algorithm more efficient (both computationally and in terms of approximability). Key words: Algorithmic game theory, mechanism design, theory of algorithms

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: ICALP
• Authors: Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano
• Keywords: Algorithmic, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, ICALP 2004, Mechanism Design, Theoretical Computer Science