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CORR
2011
Springer
177views Education» more  CORR 2011»
8 years 3 months ago
A Truthful Randomized Mechanism for Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Optimization
In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of selfinterested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public plann...
Shaddin Dughmi
FOCS
2010
IEEE
8 years 6 months ago
Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
We give the first black-box reduction from arbitrary approximation algorithms to truthful approximation mechanisms for a non-trivial class of multiparameter problems. Specifically,...
Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden
IOR
2010
161views more  IOR 2010»
8 years 6 months ago
Mechanism Design for Decentralized Online Machine Scheduling
We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism desig...
Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz
IPTPS
2003
Springer
9 years 1 months ago
Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks
Much of the existing work in peer to peer networking assumes that users will follow prescribed protocols without deviation. This assumption ignores the user’s ability to modify ...
Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
ICALP
2004
Springer
9 years 1 months ago
The Power of Verification for One-Parameter Agents
We initiate the study of mechanisms with verification for one-parameter agents. We give an algorithmic characterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably better ...
Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco, Paolo Penna, ...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
106views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
9 years 1 months ago
On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms
Algorithmic Mechanism Design focuses on Dominant Strategy Implementations. The main positive results are the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and computationally ...
Ahuva Mu'alem
MFCS
2009
Springer
9 years 2 months ago
Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
Algorithmic mechanism design considers distributed settings where the participants, termed agents, cannot be assumed to follow the protocol but rather their own interests. The pro...
Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano
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