Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games

In this paper, we study false-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Weighted voting is a well-known model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each of the players has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight exceeds a certain quota. While a player's ability to influence the outcome of the game is related to its weight, it is not always directly proportional to it. This observation has led to the concept of a power index, which is a measure of an agent's "real power" in this domain. One prominent power index is the Shapley

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2008
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind
• Keywords: ATAL 2008, Intelligent Agents, Power Index, Shapley Value, Weighted Voting