Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters

Abstract. We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters who, in addition to having preferences over election winners, also have secondary preferences, governing their behavior when their vote cannot affect the election outcome. Specifically, we study two models that have been recently considered in the literature: lazy voters, who prefer to abstain when they are not pivotal, and truth-biased voters, who prefer to vote truthfully when they are not pivotal. For both lazy and truth-biased voters, we are interested in their behavior under different tie-breaking rules (lexicographic rule, random voter rule, random candidate rule). Two of these six combinations of secondary preferences and tiebreaking rules have been studied in prior work; for the remaining four, we characterize pure Nash equilibria (PNE) of the resulting strategic games and study the complexity of related computational problems. We then use these results to analyze the impact of different secon...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2015
• Where: SAGT
• Authors: Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova, Piotr Skowron
• Keywords: Game Theory, SAGT 2015