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WINE
2005
Springer

Enforcing Truthful Strategies in Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanisms

10 years 9 months ago
Enforcing Truthful Strategies in Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanisms
Abstract. We commonly use the experience of others when taking decisions. Reputation mechanisms aggregate in a formal way the feedback collected from peers and compute the reputation of products, services, or providers. The success of reputation mechanisms is however conditioned on obtaining true feedback. Side-payments (i.e. agents get paid for submitting feedback) can make honest reporting rational (i.e. Nash equilibrium). Unfortunately, known schemes also have other Nash equilibria that imply lying. In this paper we analyze the equilibria of two incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms and investigate how undesired equilibrium points can be eliminated by using trusted reports.
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
Added 28 Jun 2010
Updated 28 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2005
Where WINE
Authors Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
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