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2000
Springer

Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software

10 years 8 months ago
Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software
Under a simple power leakage model based on Hamming weight, a software implementation of a data-whitening routine is shown to be vulnerable to a first-order Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. This routine is modified to resist the first-order DPA attack, but is subsequently shown to be vulnerable to a second-order DPA attack. A second-order DPA attack that is optimal under certain assumptions is also proposed. Experimental results in an ST16 smartcard confirm the practicality of the first and second-order DPA attacks.
Thomas S. Messerges
Added 02 Aug 2010
Updated 02 Aug 2010
Type Conference
Year 2000
Where CHES
Authors Thomas S. Messerges
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