We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
In an election held in a noisy environment, agents may unintentionally perturb the outcome by communicating faulty preferences. We investigate this setting by introducing a theore...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Gal A....
In group decision making, often the agents need to decide on multiple attributes at the same time, so that there are exponentially many alternatives. In this case, it is unrealist...
A variety of preference aggregation schemes and voting rules have been developed in social choice to support group decision making. However, the requirement that participants provi...
The complexity of the winner determination problem has been studied for almost all common voting rules. A notable exception, possibly caused by some confusion regarding its exact ...