We consider problems of provisioning an excludable public good amongst n potential members of a peer-to-peer system who are able to communicate information about their private pre...
Algorithmic Mechanism Design focuses on Dominant Strategy Implementations. The main positive results are the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and computationally ...
We define trust-based mechanism design as an augmentation of traditional mechanism design in which agents take into account the degree of trust that they have in their counterpar...
Rajdeep K. Dash, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Nicholas R...
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
Abstract. In this work, we describe the process used in order to predict the bidding strategy of trading agents. This was done in the context of the Reverse TAC, or CAT, game of th...