Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems

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Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems
We consider problems of provisioning an excludable public good amongst n potential members of a peer-to-peer system who are able to communicate information about their private preferences for the good. The cost of provisioning the good in quantity Q depends on Q, and may also depend on n, or on the final number of participating peers, m. Our aim is to maximize social welfare in a way that is incentive compatible, rational and feasible. Although it is unfortunately almost never possible to calculate or implement a truely optimal Mechanism Design, we show that as the number of participants becomes large the expected social welfare that can be obtained by the optimal design is at most a factor 1 + O(1/n) or 1 + O(1/ n) greater than that which can be obtained with a very simple scheme that requires only a fixed contribution (payment) from any agent who joins the system as a participating peer. Our first application is to a model of file sharing, in which the public good is content availa...
Costas Courcoubetis, Richard R. Weber
Added 13 Dec 2010
Updated 13 Dec 2010
Type Journal
Year 2006
Where JSAC
Authors Costas Courcoubetis, Richard R. Weber
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