44 search results - page 1 / 9 » Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders |
WINE
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there...
AAAI
2012
11 years 7 months ago
2012
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 2 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
WECWIS
2003
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2003
IEEE
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...