Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple win...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
Abstract. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences....
We study the complexity of manipulation for a family of election systems derived from Copeland voting via introducing a parameter that describes how ties in head-to-head contests...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Sch...
We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by one or more clones, i.e., new candidates that...
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko