The fastest known algorithm for solving General Bayesian Stackelberg games with a finite set of follower (adversary) types have seen direct practical use at the LAX airport for o...
Manish Jain, Christopher Kiekintveld, Milind Tambe
How do we build algorithms for agent interactions with human adversaries? Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications that involve human interaction, such...
James Pita, Manish Jain, Milind Tambe, Fernando Or...
Attacker-defender Stackelberg games have become a popular game-theoretic approach for security with deployments for LAX Police, the FAMS and the TSA. Unfortunately, most of the ex...
Zhengyu Yin, Manish Jain, Milind Tambe, Fernando O...
How do we build multiagent algorithms for agent interactions with human adversaries? Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications that involve human intera...
Security at major locations of economic or political importance is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent f...