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» Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
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TARK
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
Multiple election paradoxes arise when voting separately on each issue from a set of related issues results in an obviously undesirable outcome. Several authors have argued that a...
Lirong Xia, Jérôme Lang, Mingsheng Yi...
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2011»
12 years 7 months ago
Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes
In many settings, a group of agents must come to a joint decision on multiple issues. In practice, this is often done by voting on the issues in sequence. In this paper, we model ...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme ...
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes
We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
ECAI
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Abstract. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences....
Toby Walsh