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» Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes
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AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules
In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs t...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating togethe...
Toby Walsh
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Reasoning about judgment and preference aggregation
Agents that must reach agreements with other agents need to reason about how their preferences, judgments, and beliefs might be aggregated with those of others by the social choic...
Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael ...