In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomia...
Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaan...
We study the concept of bribery in the situation where voters are willing to change their votes as we ask them, but where their prices depend on the nature of the change we reques...
We show that the two NP-complete problems of Dodgson Score and Young Score have differing computational complexities when the winner is close to being a Condorcet winner. On the ...
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal r...
-- Electing leader is a vital issue not only in distributed computing but also in communication network [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], centralized mutual exclusion algorithm [6, 7], centralized ...