Approximability of Manipulating Elections

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Approximability of Manipulating Elections
In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomial-time approximation schemes) as well as obtain inapproximability results. In particular, we show that a large subclass of scoring protocols admits fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for the coalitional weighted manipulation problem and that if certain families of scoring protocols (e.g., veto) admitted such approximation schemes then P = NP. We also show that bribery for Borda count is NP-complete and that there is no approximation algorithm that achieves even a polynomial approximation ratio for bribery in Borda count for the case where voters have prices.
Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaan
Added 02 Oct 2010
Updated 02 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2008
Where AAAI
Authors Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Schnoor, Ilka Schnoor
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