Sciweavers

AAAI
2012
11 years 7 months ago
Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...
Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm
SODA
2012
ACM
200views Algorithms» more  SODA 2012»
11 years 7 months ago
Optimal crowdsourcing contests
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to e...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian ...
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
215views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2011»
12 years 7 months ago
Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: a field experiment
We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapte...
Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
109views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions
We investigate the class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items in unlimited supply. We adopt the worst-case competitive framework defined by [8, 4] th...
Jason D. Hartline, Robert McGrew