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10

WINE
2007
Springer

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Ad Auction Design and User Experience

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Ad Auction Design and User Experience

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When users click on poor quality advertisements, there is a hidden cost to the search engine due to the user dissatisfaction (for instance, users are less likely to click on ads in the future). We describe how to incorporate hidden costs into the GSP auction for internet ads such that it is in an advertiser’s self interest to create a user experience that maximizes eﬃciency.

Zoë Abrams, Michael Schwarz

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Economy | GSP Auction | Hidden Costs | User Dissatisfaction | WINE 2007 |

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Added	09 Jun 2010
Updated	09 Jun 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2007
Where	WINE
Authors	Zoë Abrams, Michael Schwarz

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