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SIGECOM
2010
ACM
241views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 10 months ago
A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker
Current automated market makers over binary events suffer from two problems that make them impractical. First, they are unable to adapt to liquidity, so trades cause prices to mo...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, David M. Pennock,...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
226views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 10 months ago
Auctions with online supply
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and...
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Aaron Roth
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
219views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 10 months ago
Revenue maximization with a single sample
We design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes, and we assume that the valuation...
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
201views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 10 months ago
Truthful assignment without money
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
Shaddin Dughmi, Arpita Ghosh
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
190views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
13 years 4 months ago
Composition of markets with conflicting incentives
Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami
ECommerce
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