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» Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
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SAGT
2010
Springer
191views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
13 years 3 months ago
Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
Noam Hazon, Edith Elkind
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
JAIR
2008
117views more  JAIR 2008»
13 years 4 months ago
Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple win...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2011»
12 years 7 months ago
Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes
In many settings, a group of agents must come to a joint decision on multiple issues. In practice, this is often done by voting on the issues in sequence. In this paper, we model ...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme ...
CORR
2002
Springer
108views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 4 months ago
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has receive...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm