We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis...
Abstract. We give a simple characterization of all single-item truthrevealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibili...
Kamal Jain, Aranyak Mehta, Kunal Talwar, Vijay V. ...
Teams of robots are more fault tolerant than single robots, and auctions appear to be promising means for coordinating them. In a recent paper at "Robotics: Science and Syste...
Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey, Michail G. Lagoudakis...
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there...
— We study how to improve sequential single-item auctions that assign targets to robots for exploration tasks such as environmental clean-up, space-exploration, and search and re...