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152
Voted
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 7 months ago
Learning to commit in repeated games
Learning to converge to an efficient, i.e., Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium of the repeated game is an open problem in multiagent learning. Our goal is to facilitate the learning ...
Stéphane Airiau, Sandip Sen
152
Voted
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 7 months ago
Temporal qualitative coalitional games
Qualitative Coalitional Games (QCGs) are a version of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals which are either satisfied or unsatisfied, and ea...
Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael ...
130
Voted
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 7 months ago
On the logic of coalitional games
We develop a logic for representing and reasoning about coalitional games without transferable payoffs. Although a number of logics of cooperation have been proposed over the past...
Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael ...
132
Voted
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 7 months ago
Efficient agent-based cluster ensembles
Numerous domains ranging from distributed data acquisition to knowledge reuse need to solve the cluster ensemble problem of combining multiple clusterings into a single unified cl...
Adrian K. Agogino, Kagan Tumer
100
Voted
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 7 months ago
History-based traffic control
What if traffic lights gave you a break after you've spent a long time waiting in traffic elsewhere? In this paper we examine a variety of multi-agent traffic light controlle...
Gabriel Catalin Balan, Sean Luke