Sciweavers


Publication
640views
16 years 10 months ago
Foundations of Mechanism Design: A Tutorial - Part 1: Key Concepts and Classical Results
Foundations of Mechanism Design: A Tutorial - Part 1: Key Concepts and Classical Results
Dinesh Garg, Y Narahari, Sujit Gujar
177
Voted

Publication
580views
16 years 10 months ago
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p) with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, in...
Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari
174
Voted

Publication
651views
16 years 10 months ago
On Optimal Linear Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem s...
Sujit Gujar, Y Narahari