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SODA

2012

ACM

2012

ACM

We consider the design of strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. We give two simple, but extremely versatile, black-box reductions, that in combination reduce the cost-sharing mechanism-design problem to the algorithmic problem of ﬁnding a minimum-cost solution for a set of players. Our ﬁrst reduction shows that any truthful, α-approximation mechanism for the socialcost minimization (SCM) problem satisfying a technical no-bossiness condition can be morphed into a truthful mechanism that achieves an O(α log n)-approximation where the prices recover the cost incurred. Thus, we decouple the task of truthfully computing an outcome with near-optimal social cost from the cost-sharing problem. This is fruitful since truthful mechanism-design, especially for single-dimensional problems, is a relatively well-understood and manageable task. Our second reduction nicely complements the ﬁrst one by showing that any LP-based ρ-approximation for the problem of ﬁnding a min-cost solution f...

Added |
28 Sep 2012 |

Updated |
28 Sep 2012 |

Type |
Journal |

Year |
2012 |

Where |
SODA |

Authors |
Konstantinos Georgiou, Chaitanya Swamy |

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