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CSFW
2006
IEEE

Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting

13 years 11 months ago
Coercion-Resistance and Receipt-Freeness in Electronic Voting
In this paper we formally study important properties of electronic voting protocols. In particular we are interested in coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness. Intuitively, an election protocol is coercion-resistant if a voter A cannot prove to a potential coercer C that she voted in a particular way. We assume that A cooperates with C in an interactive fashion. Receipt-freeness is a weaker property, for which we assume that A and C cannot interact during the protocol: to break receipt-freeness, A later provides evidence (the receipt) of how she voted. While receipt-freeness can be expressed using observational equivalence from the applied pi calculus, we need to introduce a new relation to capture coercion-resistance. Our formalization of coercionresistance and receipt-freeness are quite different. Nevertheless, we show in accordance with intuition that coercionresistance implies receipt-freeness, which implies privacy, the basic anonymity property of voting protocols, as defined ...
Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, Mark Ryan
Added 10 Jun 2010
Updated 10 Jun 2010
Type Conference
Year 2006
Where CSFW
Authors Stéphanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, Mark Ryan
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