Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core

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Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game theory. However, the computational questions around this constraint have received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly explicit. In this paper we define a concise general representation for games in characteristic form that relies on superadditivity, and show that it allows for efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then show that de...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
Added 05 Jul 2010
Updated 05 Jul 2010
Type Conference
Year 2003
Authors Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
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