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CCS
2009
ACM

Computational soundness for key exchange protocols with symmetric encryption

14 years 14 days ago
Computational soundness for key exchange protocols with symmetric encryption
Formal analysis of security protocols based on symbolic models has been very successful in finding flaws in published protocols and proving protocols secure, using automated tools. An important question is whether this kind of formal analysis implies security guarantees in the strong sense of modern cryptography. Initiated by the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway, this question has been investigated and numerous positive results showing this so-called computational soundness of formal analysis have been obtained. However, for the case of active adversaries and protocols that use symmetric encryption computational soundness has remained a challenge. In this paper, we show the first general computational soundness result for key exchange protocols with symmetric encryption, along the lines of a paper by Canetti and Herzog on protocols with public-key encryption. More specifically, we develop a symbolic, automatically checkable criterion, based on observational equivalence, and show ...
Ralf Küsters, Max Tuengerthal
Added 19 May 2010
Updated 19 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where CCS
Authors Ralf Küsters, Max Tuengerthal
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