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AAAI
2010

Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction

13 years 11 months ago
Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction
Using a model of agent behavior based around envy-reducing strategies, we describe an iterated combinatorial auction in which the allocation and prices converge to a solution in the core of the agents' true valuations. In each round of the iterative auction mechanism, agents act on envy quotes produced by the mechanism: hints that suggest the prices of the bundles they are interested in. We describe optimal methods of generating envy quotes for various core-selecting mechanisms. Prior work on core-selecting combinatorial auctions has required agents to have perfect information about every agent's valuations to achieve a solution in the core. In contrast, here a core solution is reached even in the private information setting.
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm
Added 29 Oct 2010
Updated 29 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2010
Where AAAI
Authors Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm
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