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ATAL
2003
Springer

Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions

14 years 3 months ago
Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. However, expressing one’s preferences can require bidding on all bundles. Selective incremental preference elicitation by the auctioneer was recently proposed to address this problem [4], but the idea was not evaluated. In this paper we show that automated elicitation is extremely beneficial: as the number of items for sale increases, the amount of information elicited is a vanishing fraction of the information collected in traditional “direct revelation mechanisms” where bidders reveal all their valuation information. The elicitors also maintain the benefit as the number of agents increases—except rank lattice based elicitors which we show ineffective. We also develop elicitors that combine different query types, and we present a new query type that takes the incremental nature of elicitation to a ne...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
Added 06 Jul 2010
Updated 06 Jul 2010
Type Conference
Year 2003
Where ATAL
Authors Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
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