On the Impact of Local Taxes in a Set Cover Game

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On the Impact of Local Taxes in a Set Cover Game
Given a collection C of weighted subsets of a ground set E, the set cover problem is to find a minimum weight subset of C which covers all elements of E. We study a strategic game defined upon this classical optimization problem. Every element of E is a player which chooses one set of C where it appears. Following a public tax function, every player is charged a fraction of the weight of the set that it has selected. Our motivation is to design a tax function having the following features: it can be implemented in a distributed manner, existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed and the social cost for these equilibria is minimized.
Bruno Escoffier, Laurent Gourvès, Jé
Added 29 Oct 2010
Updated 29 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2010
Authors Bruno Escoffier, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot
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