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SP
2009
IEEE

Practical Mitigations for Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Modern x86 Processors

14 years 4 months ago
Practical Mitigations for Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks on Modern x86 Processors
—This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side-channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through sidechannels that relate to control flow and data flow. To eliminate key-dependent control flow and key-dependent timing behavior related to control flow, we propose the use of if-conversion in a compiler backend, and evaluate a proof-of-concept prototype implementation. Furthermore, we demonstrate two ways in which programs that lack key-dependent control flow and keydependent cache behavior can still leak timing information on modern x86 implementations such as the Intel Core 2 Duo, and propose defense mechanisms against them.
Bart Coppens, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Koen De Bosscher
Added 21 May 2010
Updated 21 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where SP
Authors Bart Coppens, Ingrid Verbauwhede, Koen De Bosschere, Bjorn De Sutter
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