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MFCS
2009
Springer

Private Capacities in Mechanism Design

13 years 10 months ago
Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
Algorithmic mechanism design considers distributed settings where the participants, termed agents, cannot be assumed to follow the protocol but rather their own interests. The protocol can be regarded as an algorithm augmented with a suitable payment rule and the desired condition is termed truthfulness, meaning that it is never convenient for an agent to report false information. Motivated by the applications, we extend the usual one-parameter and multiparameter settings by considering agents with private capacities: each agent can misreport her cost for “executing” a single unit of work and the maximum amount of work that each agent can actually execute (i.e., the capacity of the agent). We show that truthfulness in this setting is equivalent to a simple condition on the underlying algorithm. By applying this result to various problems considered in the literature (e.g., makespan minimization on related machines) we show that only some of the existing approaches to the case “w...
Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano
Added 27 May 2010
Updated 27 May 2010
Type Conference
Year 2009
Where MFCS
Authors Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano
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