Side channel power analysis of an AES-256 bootloader

7 years 10 months ago
Side channel power analysis of an AES-256 bootloader
Abstract— Side Channel Attacks (SCA) using power measurements are a known method of breaking cryptographic algorithms such as AES. Published research into attacks on AES frequently target only AES-128, and often target only the core Electronic Code-Book (ECB) algorithm, without discussing surrounding issues such as triggering, along with breaking the initialization vector. This paper demonstrates a complete attack on a secure bootloader, where the firmware files have been encrypted with AES-256-CBC. A classic Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack is performed on AES-256 to recover the complete 32byte key, and a CPA attack is also used to attempt recovery of the initialization vector (IV).
Colin O'Flynn, Zhizhang (David) Chen
Added 17 Apr 2016
Updated 17 Apr 2016
Type Journal
Year 2015
Authors Colin O'Flynn, Zhizhang (David) Chen
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