Signalling Preferences in Interviewing Markets

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Signalling Preferences in Interviewing Markets
The process of match formation in matching markets can be divided into three parts: information sharing, investments in information acquisition, and the formation of matches based on available information. The last stage where agents are assumed to know their preferences has been studied in seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1962), and a model of second stage costly information acquisition is introduced and studied in Lee and Schwarz (2007). This paper focuses on the first stage – information sharing – and examines mechanisms which allow workers to signal their preferences over matching partners prior to the assignment of interviews. The incentives of firms and workers vis-a-vis information revelation are partially aligned – all other things being equal, a worker prefers to have an interview with a firm that is high in his preference ranking and a firm prefers to invest in interviewing a worker who ranks a firm highly because such worker is more likely to accept a job if o...
Robin S. Lee, Michael A. Schwarz
Added 29 Oct 2010
Updated 29 Oct 2010
Type Conference
Year 2007
Authors Robin S. Lee, Michael A. Schwarz
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