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» A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms
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SAGT
2009
Springer
192views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
15 years 4 months ago
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms
Abstract. A mechanism is manipulable if it is in some agents’ best interest to misrepresent their private information. The revelation principle establishes that, roughly, anythin...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm
WWW
2008
ACM
15 years 10 months ago
Dynamic cost-per-action mechanisms and applications to online advertising
We study the Cost-Per-Action or Cost-Per-Acquisition (CPA) charging scheme in online advertising. In this scheme, instead of paying per click, the advertisers pay only when a user...
Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi, Rakesh Vohra
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Computational mechanism design for multi-sensor information fusion
Conventional information fusion architectures are challenged by developments in sensor networks that allow individually-owned (and thereby selfish) sensors to interact and share d...
Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings...
ICALP
2004
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
The Power of Verification for One-Parameter Agents
We initiate the study of mechanisms with verification for one-parameter agents. We give an algorithmic characterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably better ...
Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco, Paolo Penna, ...
CCS
2004
ACM
15 years 3 months ago
Comparing the expressive power of access control models
Comparing the expressive power of access control models is recognized as a fundamental problem in computer security. Such comparisons are generally based on simulations between di...
Mahesh V. Tripunitara, Ninghui Li