We consider a multicast game with selfish non-cooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing de...
Chandra Chekuri, Julia Chuzhoy, Liane Lewin-Eytan,...
We present a technique for reducing a normal-form (aka. (bi)matrix) game, O, to a smaller normal-form game, R, for the purpose of computing a Nash equilibrium. This is done by com...
Efficient Learning Equilibrium (ELE) is a natural solution concept for multi-agent encounters with incomplete information. It requires the learning algorithms themselves to be in ...
The solution to a Nash or a nonsymmetric bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a concave function over a convex set, i.e., it is the solution to a convex program. We show that...
We provide a series of algorithms demonstrating that solutions according to the fundamental game-theoretic solution concept of closed under rational behavior (CURB) sets in two-pl...