This paper introduces a multiagent reinforcement learning algorithm that converges with a given accuracy to stationary Nash equilibria in general-sum discounted stochastic games. ...
R-max is a very simple model-based reinforcement learning algorithm which can attain near-optimal average reward in polynomial time. In R-max, the agent always maintains a complet...
We introduce a new class of games, asynchronous congestion games (ACGs). In an ACG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each r...
Abstract. In this work we study the tractability of well supported approximate Nash Equilibria (SuppNE in short) in bimatrix games. In view of the apparent intractability of constr...
Learning algorithms often obtain relatively low average payoffs in repeated general-sum games between other learning agents due to a focus on myopic best-response and one-shot Nas...