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ATAL
2007
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
A randomized method for the shapley value for the voting game
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
ATAL
2008
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered i...
Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsu...
ATAL
2005
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
An analysis of the shapley value and its uncertainty for the voting game
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
ATAL
2008
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
In this paper, we study false-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Weighted voting is a well-known model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such ga...
Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind
ATAL
2008
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
Approximating power indices
Many multiagent domains where cooperation among agents is crucial to achieving a common goal can be modeled as coalitional games. However, in many of these domains, agents are une...
Yoram Bachrach, Evangelos Markakis, Ariel D. Proca...