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» A randomized method for the shapley value for the voting gam...
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ATAL
2007
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
A randomized method for the shapley value for the voting game
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
ATAL
2008
Springer
15 years 26 days ago
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered i...
Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsu...
ATAL
2005
Springer
15 years 4 months ago
An analysis of the shapley value and its uncertainty for the voting game
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
ATAL
2008
Springer
15 years 26 days ago
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
In this paper, we study false-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Weighted voting is a well-known model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such ga...
Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind
84
Voted
ATAL
2008
Springer
15 years 26 days ago
Approximating power indices
Many multiagent domains where cooperation among agents is crucial to achieving a common goal can be modeled as coalitional games. However, in many of these domains, agents are une...
Yoram Bachrach, Evangelos Markakis, Ariel D. Proca...