7 search results - page 1 / 2 » A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently man... |
74
Voted
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
14 years 9 months ago
2008
ACM
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
61
Voted
TARK
2007
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
2007
Springer
A classical result in voting theory, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, states that for any non-dictatorial voting rule for choosing between three or more candidates, there will b...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
14 years 9 months ago
2008
ACM
We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based onl...
AAAI
2010
14 years 11 months ago
2010
Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents' ...
71
Voted
ATAL
2010
Springer
14 years 10 months ago
2010
Springer
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...