In this paper we propose a new persuasion dialogue game for agent communication. We show how this dialogue game is modeled by a framework based on social commitments and arguments....
We consider one-round games between a classical verifier and two provers who share entanglement. We show that when the constraints enforced by the verifier are ‘unique’ cons...
Much of the work on opponent modeling for game tree search has been unsuccessful. In two-player, zero-sum games, the gains from opponent modeling are often outweighed by the cost ...
Nathan R. Sturtevant, Martin Zinkevich, Michael H....
The Strategy Game Description Game Language (SGDL) is intended to become a complete description of all aspects of strategy games, including rules, parameters, scenarios, maps, and ...
Tobias Mahlmann, Julian Togelius, Georgios N. Yann...
Efficient Learning Equilibrium (ELE) is a natural solution concept for multi-agent encounters with incomplete information. It requires the learning algorithms themselves to be in ...