We consider approval voting elections in which each voter votes for a (possibly empty) set of candidates and the outcome consists of a set of k candidates for some parameter k, e....
Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Kalaitzis, Evangelos...
The problem of coalition formation when agents are uncertain about the types or capabilities of their potential partners is a critical one. In [3] a Bayesian reinforcement learnin...
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games. These coalition formation games are specified by an undirected e...
The agents in multiagent systems can coordinate their actions and handle tasks jointly by forming coalitions. One of the important steps in this process is the fair division of pa...
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...