We resolve an open problem regarding the complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation, namely, the complexity of Copeland -manipulation for {0, 1}. Copeland , 0 1, is an...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Sch...
An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational compl...
Coalition formation is a problem of great interest in AI, allowing groups of autonomous, individually rational agents to form stable teams. Automating the negotiations underlying ...
In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomia...
Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaan...
1 In multi-agent systems (MAS), coalition formation is typically studied using characteristic function game (CFG) representations, where the performance of any coalition is indepen...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Andrew Dowell, Peter McBurney,...