In this paper we show that any two-party functionality can be securely computed in a constant number of rounds, where security is obtained against malicious adversaries that may ar...
Most discussions of computer security focus on control of disclosure. In Particular, the U.S. Department of Defense has developed a set of criteria for computer mechanisms to prov...
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of security protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the co...
Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two versions of a protocol. In this paper, we show that computational proofs of indistinguishabili...
We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound security properties of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventiona...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Bogdan...