Agent interactions where the agents hold conflicting goals could be modelled as adversarial argumentation games. In many real-life situations (e.g., criminal litigation, consumer ...
Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of a...
Abstract. In this paper we recast the formalism of argumentation formalism known as DeLP (Defeasible Logic Programming) in game-theoretic terms. By considering a game between a Pro...
Negotiation can be conceived as the exchange of messages among self-interested agents in order to settle on an agreement over a given issue. They decide which messages to send acco...
This paper analyses the phenomenon of a shift of the burden of proof in legal persuasion dialogues. Some sample dialogues are analysed of types of situations where such a shift ma...