In many practical settings, participants are willing to deviate from the protocol only if they remain undetected. Aumann and Lindell introduced a concept of covert adversaries to f...
Motivated by the question of basing cryptographic protocols on stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens, we revisit the question of unconditional two-prover zero-knowledge proofs fo...
Vipul Goyal, Yuval Ishai, Mohammad Mahmoody, Amit ...
Consider the problem of verifying security properties of a cryptographic protocol coded in C. We propose an automatic solution that needs neither a pre-existing protocol descripti...
Abstract—In this paper, we study algebraic aggregate computations in Sensor Networks. The main contribution is the presentation of an early-stopping protocol that computes the av...
Cryptographic protocols can only be secure under certain inequality assumptions. Axiomatizing these inequalities explicitly is problematic: stating too many inequalities may impair...