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AAAI
2010
15 years 1 months ago
Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules
In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs t...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
AAAI
2010
15 years 1 months ago
Voting Almost Maximizes Social Welfare Despite Limited Communication
In cooperative multiagent systems an alternative that maximizes the social welfare--the sum of utilities--can only be selected if each agent reports its full utility function. Thi...
Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia
AAAI
2004
15 years 1 months ago
A Computational Study of the Kemeny Rule for Preference Aggregation
We consider from a computational perspective the problem of how to aggregate the ranking preferences of a number of alternatives by a number of different voters into a single cons...
Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam
CORR
2010
Springer
116views Education» more  CORR 2010»
14 years 12 months ago
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
One possible escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is computational complexity. For example, it is NP-hard to compute if the STV rule can be manipulated. However, there is...
Toby Walsh