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» Approximability of Manipulating Elections
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SIAMCOMP
2011
12 years 9 months ago
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative versi...
Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, Nathan Keller, Noam Nisa...
JAIR
2008
117views more  JAIR 2008»
13 years 6 months ago
Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple win...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
SAC
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
Taking total control of voting systems: firmware manipulations on an optical scan voting terminal
The firmware of an electronic voting machine is typically treated as a “trusted” component of the system. Consequently, it is misconstrued to be vulnerable only to an insider...
Seda Davtyan, Sotiris Kentros, Aggelos Kiayias, La...
AAAI
2007
13 years 8 months ago
Uncertainty in Preference Elicitation and Aggregation
Uncertainty arises in preference aggregation in several ways. There may, for example, be uncertainty in the votes or the voting rule. Such uncertainty can introduce computational ...
Toby Walsh
CORR
2006
Springer
154views Education» more  CORR 2006»
13 years 6 months ago
How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change t...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hem...